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LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1964
CIVIL CODE AND RELATED LEGISLATION
PERSONS AND THE FAMILY
Robert A. Pascal*
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE

Article 160 of the Civil Code, the principal legislation on the
substantive law of alimony after divorce, has been amended by
Act 48 of 1964, pursuant to a bill recommended by the Louisiana
State Law Institute and growing out of that body's consideration of proposals to amend the new Code of Civil Procedure.1
A great merit of the amendment is that article 160 now
makes it perfectly clear that only the wife not at fault can ever
be entitled to alimony. The prior legislation was not so clear,
although, in the opinion of this writer, this should always have
been its interpretation. When article 160 first became part of
our law, divorce was obtainable only by that spouse who had
obtained, or who had the right to obtain, a separation from bed
and board, and a separation was obtainable only by a party who
could prove a cause in the nature of fault on the part of the defendant spouse. Thus, at that time, the language of article 160,
that only the wife who had "obtained the divorce" should be
entitled to alimony, was entirely suitable to limit alimony to the
wife who had not been at fault. When Act 25 of 1898 (later, as
amended, R.S. 9:302) introduced the possibility that the party
against whom the separation had been pronounced might obtain
the divorce on a showing of non-reconciliation over a period of
time, the quoted language of article 160 became inaccurate,
inasmuch as its literal application could result (1) in the wife's
being denied alimony, even if she had obtained the separation, if
the husband obtained the divorce under Act 25 of 1898, and (2)
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-23 (Feb. 20, 1964) ; LOUISIANA STATE
LAW INSTITUTE, RECOMMITTED AND REVISED MATERIALS INCLUDED IN THE
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-2 (April

17, 1964).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV

in the wife's being allowed alimony if she obtained the divorce
on the basis of non-reconciliation, even if the husband had obtained the separation because of her fault. Act 25 of 1898 itself
foresaw at least the first of these results, for it provided that
the wife obtaining the separation should not lose her right to
alimony merely because the husband later sued for divorce under
that act. Nothing was said about the wife's right to alimony
if she obtained the divorce after the husband had obtained the
separation, but in practice she was not awarded alimony in such
a case.
A further complication was introduced in 1916,2 with the
acceptance of divorce based simply on separation in fact for a
definite period of time. Were the words of article 160, allowing alimony to the wife who had "obtained the divorce," to be
applied literally to allow her alimony if she sued and obtained
the judgment, and to deny it to her if her husband obtained the
judgment, without regard to which of the spouses had been at
fault in causing the separation which led to the divorce? Once
more legislation intervened, but unsatisfactorily. Article 160
was amended by the addition of language which allowed the
wife alimony when the husband obtained the divorce on this
ground of separation in fact for a period of time, provided she
had not been "at fault." But nothing was said of denying alimony to the wife who obtained the divorce if she had been at
fault, and for years our decisions allowed her alimony if she obtained the divorce, without requiring her to prove she had not
been at fault or even permitting the husband to show she had
been at fault. 4 Finally, in 1956, the Supreme Court indicated it
would not allow alimony to the wife at fault even if she obtained
the divorce on the basis of separation in fact for a period of
time ;5 but until this year article 160 had been permitted to remain in its inadequately stated form. Thus the new amendment
is a welcome accomplishment.
The effectuation of this improvement was not, however, the
2. La. Acts 1916, No. 269, which as amended became LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950).
3. La. Acts 1928, No. 21.
4. This interpretation of the law is forcefully presented in Justice McCaleb's
dissenting opinion in McKnight v. Irving, 228 La. 1088, 85 So. 2d 1 (1956), a
decision which implied that the majority was ready to overrule the prior jurisprudence.
5. McKnight v. Irving, 228 La. 1088, 85 So. 2d 1 (1956) ; accord, Sachse v.
Sachse, 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; contra, Moreau v. Moreau, 142
So. 2d 423 (a. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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primary motive of the Louisiana State Law Institute in recommending the amendment to article 160 of the Civil Code. It was
rather to add to article 160 language giving the wife a right to
-alimony from her husband (where she was not at fault and is
without sufficient means) in instances in which the husband
obtained the divorce ex parte in another state or country. That
this legislation was intended to state a substantive right as distinguished from a procedural one is clear from the Institute's
documents.6 What, however, is the realm of application of this
new substantive provision?
This new provision extends certainly to an ex-wife's suit for
alimony in this state when both she and her husband are domiciled here, but after the husband has obtained an ex parte divorce in another state where he was then domiciled. This would
be the minimal interpretation of the provision, an interpretation
as a rule of domestic law only. Does the provision extend the
right of alimony to a wife so divorced but not domiciled in Louisiana at the time of suit for alimony? The Institute's documents show that its intention was to extend the right to wives
domiciled in this state when divorced elsewhere (and, probably,
still domiciled here) .7 The provision itself does not carry such
a limitation in express terms, but it would not be difficult to
infer one from the context of the article. More seriously, however, may the wife ask for alimony under this provision even if
her ex-husband is domiciled outside this state when suit is
brought? Here the Institute's documents leave no doubt that
this is precisely the case which the new provision was intended
to cover.8 In the opinion of this writer this rule is not a good
one. It is, however, a rule which will stand the test of permissibility under existing United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the United States Constitution; but, in the writer's
opinion, these decisions are open to question.
The opinion given above is predicated on the writer's firm
conviction that one's familial obligations ought to be deter6. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LOUISIANA CODE OF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (Feb. 20, 1964) ; LOUISIAN'A STATE LAW
INSTITUTE, RECOMMITTED AND REVISED MATERIALS INCLUDED IN THE THIRD
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 (April 17,

1964).

7. See note 1 supra.
8. LOUISIANA STATE
INCLUDED IN

PROCEDURE 21

LAW INSTITUTE, RECOMMITTED AND REVISED MATERIALS
THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL

(April 17, 1964).
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mined primarily by his personal law, that is to say, the law of
the state or country of whose society he forms a part. Being
convinced, further, that domicile is the factor most appropriate
to determine one's membership in a legal community, the writer
would say that one's familial obligation should be determined
by the law of the state or country of his domicile. The attempt
to force upon a person a familial obligation not imposed by his
domiciliary law is both a denial to his community of the right
to determine the laws under which its citizens shall live and a
denial to the individual person of his right to live according to
the rules of his chosen community. This premise, on reflection,
will be understood as that necessarily implicit in the doctrine of
Williams v. North Carolina 19 and subsequent cases on divorce
jurisdiction under the full faith and credit clause: only the
state of a party's domicile (and logically only that of the plaintiff's domicile) may determine the bases on which his marital
status may be altered, for his familial relationships are appropriately the concern only of that society of which he forms part.
If the above reasoning is accepted, then it will be apparent
that a rule of law permitting one party to claim alimony according to a substantive law other than that of the defendant's domicile should be considered in violation of the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution, for in fact full faith
and credit is then being denied to the law of the defendant's
domicile. 10 On the other hand, it would seem unjustifiable to
9. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
10. The full faith and credit clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1) requires that
such credit "shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
proceedings of every other state" ; and, by its second sentence, "the Congress may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." It would seem that this language
gives the Congress the power to delineate the law-making as well as the judgmentrendering authority of the several states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952), passed pursuant to the full faith and credit clause, requires the states and territories of
the United States to give full faith and credit to each other's public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings. This legislation, however, does not provide the norm
or norms for delineating interstate legislative and judicial authority, and thus
the states continue to determine such jurisdiction for themselves subject to decisions by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, has
rendered decisions delineating the legislative authority of the states in only some
matters, and at times has done so under the due process clause (amend. XIV,
§ 1) rather than under the full faith and credit clause. For example, Williams v.
North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), though not articulated as such, is in
reality a decision on legislative jurisdiction as to authorize divorce as well as on
judicial jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the suit therefor. See also First
National Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), in which the majority,
through Mr. Justice Black, decided that an Illinois statute (according to which
wrongful death actions arising under the laws of other states were not to be
tried in Illinois) denied full faith and credit to the statutes of other states.
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impose upon the defendant (obligor) liability to pay more than
the amount to which the plaintiff (obligee) would be entitled
under the law of his own domicile; the obligee should not be
entitled to expect more. Hence it would seem that the substantive obligation for alimony should never exceed either that imposed by the law of the defendant's domicile or that which would
have been imposed by the law of the plaintiff's. domicile, were
it applicable.
It is to be admitted, however, that the imposition of alimentary obligations according to the law of the defendant's
domicile has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
The principal case is Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt," but the writer
submits that the decision is unsound. There the court affirmed
New York's application of its own law, against a non-domiciliary husband who had obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada,
on the ground that without personal jurisdiction over the wife
Nevada had no jurisdiction to terminate "any right which she
had under the law of New York" for support from her nondomiciliary husband. The writer is of the opinion that this decision resulted from a failure to give the issue its proper characterization. The question should not have been whether Nevada could terminate the wife's right to alimony under New
York law, but whether the husband's obligation was to be determined by the law of New York or by that of his domicile; or,
to phrase the issue in more scientific legal language, whether
legislative competence in the matter properly belonged to New
York or to Nevada. Whatever one's opinion of the merits of
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, however, that decision does not require
a state to grant a substantive right of alimony in such cases,
and the writer submits that it would have been better to refrain
from doing so in Louisiana.
Again, the decisions on the authority of a state to levy taxes on persons or prop-

erty must be understood in terms of decisions as to legislative jurisdiction to tax,
regardless of how they may be phrased. Of interest on the general problem are
Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S.
202 (1933), which involved an alimony judgment; Cook, Powers of Congress
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919) ; Corwin, The
Full Fait&and Credit Clause, 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 371 (1933) ; Cheatham,
Federal Control of the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953) ; Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice
of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449 (1959) ; and JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVE NMENT 4144 (1955).

11. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).

